The Limits Of Human Nature

It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding norms that would otherwise follow from their theory.One argument is that certain commitments ground psychological incapacitiesthat prevent us from doing what would maximize the good. Another is that we would be likely to suffer some kind of psychological demoralization if we tried to become significantly more selfless. I argue that influential versions of both of these arguments underestimate our deliberative resources, and also fail to examine the kind of moral sources that may be able to sustain rigorous moral endeavour. Pessimism about our capacities for such endeavour results from the neglect of these factors, rather than from uncovering any significant limitations in human nature

Information Systems Strategy and Configural Technologies: Cases froom the UK Public Sector

This paper draws upon symbolic interactionism in order to assess and discuss the findings from a longitudinal, single sector, case-based analysis of information system strategy (ISS) formation within two public sector institutions - institutions that are often characterised as bureaucratic in form, and culture. Each case acquired sought large, complex applications off-the-shelf that required customisation. These are discussed as configurational technologies. The research has been informed by differences in perspective about the nature of ISS formation as reported in the literature - with discussions of ISS often portrayed in bipolar terms; e.g. ISS as either planned or emergent. Literature suggests that the greater the sectoral stability, and the more oriented towards bureaucracy the institutional form, the more likely ISS planning will be formal - as opposed to emergent or evolutionary for example. First, an argument is presented against the logic of bi-polarity that is evident in many debates about ISS. Second, a case is made for the use of interactionist thinking as a means of better understanding the political processes that shape ISS formation. From symbolic interactionism, we utilise concepts of social worlds, trajectories, and boundary objects. Findings from the empirical study are presented, from which the discussion focuses upon the social shaping of trajectories, and the politics of configuration as constituents of the complex practice of ISS formation

If ICTs are Laboratories...

The authors argue for a monist view of sociotechnical analysis, and, following Fleck and his colleagues, discuss ICTs as laboratories where knowledge, activities and artefacts emerge across different sites and different stages of development. Researchers at a number of mature research sites (what Gieryn calls ‘truth spots’) have identified distinctive sociotechnical phenomena. These have been objectified and described in a scientific nomenclature that allows research to cumulate and comparisons to be made at a level that transcends the individual agent, the individual artefact and the local context. Five phenomena are discussed in detail: sociotechnical interaction networks; computerization movements; innofusion; configuration; multi-level social learning. The approach outlined in the paper, the authors suggest, may improve the focus of research in the IS domain

How Academics Can Help People Make Better Decisions Concerning Global Poverty

One relatively straightforward way in which academics could have more impact on global poverty is by doing more to help people make wise decisions about issues relevant to such poverty. Academics could do this by conducting appropriate kinds of research on those issues and sharing what they have learned with the relevant decision makers in accessible ways. But aren’t academics already doing this? In the case of many of those issues, I think the appropriate answer would be that they could do so much better. As an illustration, I examine the academic input into one decision about an issue concerning global poverty in some detail in this paper. I argue that that input has been seriously deficient, and suggest some ways in which it might be improved. Building on this discussion, I then formulate two questions that can be applied to any such decision, answers to which would indicate the quality of the input academics are currently providing. In cases where that input is deficient, and the decision in question an important one, I suggest that academics consider organising themselves in ways that will improve that input. I finish by briefly discussing how Academics Stand Against Poverty might help them do so

Aid Agencies: The Epistemic Question

For several decades, there has been a debate in the philosophical literature concerning whether those of us who live in developed countries are morally required to give some of our money to aid agencies. Many contributors to this debate have apparently taken it that one may simply assume that the effects of the work such agencies do are overwhelmingly positive. If one turns to the literature on such agencies that has emerged in recent decades, however, one finds a number of concerns about such agencies and the work they do that put that assumption in serious doubt. This situation raises a number of pressing questions, many of which have received little or no attention from philosophers. After articulating a number of those questions, I focus mainly on what I call the `Epistemic Question (for potential contributors to aid agencies)ÿ: How can those of us who are not experts in international aid arrive at an estimate concerning the effects of the work aid agencies do that we have at least some good reason to believe accurate

Fairness and Fair Shares

Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won\u27t do their fair share - each agent\u27s fair share being what she would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won\u27t do their fair share. The philosopher who has written most about this issue, however, Liam Murphy, argues that it is not unfair to do so, at least in the standard sense of that term. In this article, I give Murphy\u27s reasons for saying this, explain why I think he\u27s wrong, and then say a little about why this issue might be important

Delivering Public Assistance: What Does It Mean to Follow the Law?

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the rare public program that provides direct assistance to families in need. Georgia, like other states, receives block grants to administer TANF. What is the current state of the TANF program in Georgia and is assistance getting to those who need it? Should the state be more proactive in reaching out to those who qualify for assistance? Are there times when qualifying families are unable to access benefits due to administrative hurdles and poor customer service? What recourse do families have if they are not treated fairly by TANF administrators? This panel will ask why Georgia has among the lowest rates of TANF assistance in the country (8% of impoverished families receiving assistance) despite having among the highest rates of poverty (approximately 300,000 families living in poverty)